How large are potential benefits from global risksharing? In order to answer this question we propose a new methodology that is closely connected with the empirical growth literature. We obtain estimates of residual risk (growth uncertainty) at various horizons from regressions of country-specific growth in deviation from, world growth on a wide set of variables in the information set. Since this residual risk can be entirely hedged through risksharing, we use it to obtain a measure of the potential welfare gain'for' a representative country. We find that nations can reap very large benefits from, engaging in such risksharing arrangements. We would like to thank Richard Easterlin for his help in obtaining the fertility data. We literature. We obtain estimates of residual risk (growth uncertainty) at various horizons from regressions of country-specific growth in deviation from, world growth on a wide set of vari.ables in the information set. Since this residual risk can be entirely hedged through ri-sksharing, we use it to obtain a measure of the potential welfare gain' for' a representative country. We find that nations can reap very large benefits from, engaging in such risksharing arrangements. Using post-war data, the gain for a 35-year horizon, corresponding to an equivalent permanent increase in consumption, is 6.6% when based on a set of 49 countries, and 1.5% when based on 21 OECD countri.es. Using historical data from. 1870 to 1990, we find that the potential gain for a 120-year hori.zon ranges from. 4-9% for a small set of ri.ch countri.es to 16.5% for a broad set of 24 countri.es.
1
Introduction.
How rich will the Russians be compared to the British in twenty, thirty or fifty years?
Will India still be poor relative to the rest of the world in one century, and will the US still be the leader? There are many, stunning examples in history of countries which were once rich but are now poor, and vice versa. Although one can attempt to make predictions about growth, there will remain significant uncertainty about relative growth rates a,t long horizons. We show empiric^ly that oyer a period of 35 years one country's per capita GDP can, purely by chance, _easily, double relative to that of another. The growth hterature so far^is primarily concerned with explaining these differences in long tenn^owth rates, but has paid little attention to long term growth uncertainty. } Our goal in this paper is to measure grp^h uncertainty at various horizons and compute the welfare gain from-sharing this macroeconomic, risk among nations.;
In international macroeconomics a.large.hterature has developed in recent years evaluating the gains from risksharing among countries. This interest stems from twosources. First, risksharing associated with intratemporal asset trade is one of the three . ' * ' Ik ey roles of international financial markets. The other two are consumption smoothing through intertemporal asset trade and allocating resources to their-most productive uses. The benchmark model in international.macroeconomics is one of complete markets, where all three roles are performed perfec,tly (e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) ).
Second, the evidence indicates that the real world is far removed from the per fect risksharing paradigm that is the centerpiece of our models. The perfect riskshar ing hypothesis is generally rejected in formal regression-based tests (Canova and Ravn 1994] , Lewis [1996] and Obstfeld [1994c]j. 4. problem with perfect-risksharing\ models is that the imphed correlation of consumption across countries is much-larger'-than the income correlation, while the opposite is observed in the data. 'Backus, Ke hoe and Kydland [1992] have coined this 'the '"quantity anomaly". Direct evidence on international portfolio diversification, e.g. by French and Poterba [1991] and Tesar and Werner [1994] , shows that there is a strong-home bias in equity portfolios. Trade in claims on a broad measure of national output's-currently does not even exist . Shiller 1993] has made a strong case for the introduction of such'markets.t
All exception is Easterly, et.al. [1993] , wlio (conclude that "much variation in growth rates is due to random shocks' . They find that the low persistence ofdecade average growth rates is associated with random shocks since "country-diaracteristics" arc highly persistent. Shiller and Athanasoulis [1995] and Athanasoulis'[1996] show how such markets may be constructed.
A lack of risksharing among nations is no surprise if the potential welfare payoff is small. Results reported in the literature vary enormously, ranging from less than 0.1%
(welfare equivalent permanent increase in expected consumption) to over 100%. This has led to considerable confusion concerning the true magnitude of these gains.v an Wincoop [1994 Wincoop [ , 1996b shows that the welfare gain from risksharing depends on four factors (i) the risk-free interest rate, (ii) the risk-adjusted growth rate, (iii) the rate of relative risk-aversion, and (iv) uncertainty about the endowment. The first two are relatively easy to measure.® After choosing a consensus estimate for the rate of relative risk-aversion, the main obstacle that remains is measuring endowment uncer tainty. ®The approach that is taken throughout the literatiure is to estimate a specific process for the endowment. The problem with this is that the results are very sensitive to both the type of process assumed and the parameters of a specific process. As an example, van Wincoop [1996b] considers different endowment processes for a set of 21 OECD countries, setting the rate of relative risk-aversion at three. The welfare gain for a representative country at a lOO-year horizon is 5.6% when the endowment is assumed to follow an AR in growth rates, 0.2% when a global cointegration term is added to the AR in growth rates, and 0.1% when the process is stationary (approximately an AR (1) with a deterministic trend).
Rather than assuming a particular endowment process, here we adopt an alternative approach whereby we only make assumptions about the information set used to predict future growth. Since only uncertainty about deviations from world growth matters for van Wincoop {1996b| for a discussion ofthis literature andexplanations for the widely diverging welfare gain measures. Recent papers that have computed welfare gains from risksharing across countries include Athanaaoulis [1996] , Backus. Kchoe'and Kydland [1992] , Cole and Obstfeld [199r] 7Kbse [1995] , LcwiH [199t) a], Mendoza [1994 Mendoza [ ,1995 , Obstfeld [1994a Obstfeld [ ,b,1995 , Shiller and AthanasouUs [1995] , Tes'ar [1995] and van Wincoop [1994, 199tia,b] . ''van Wincoop [1994] shows that, given these four factors, the welfare gain does not depend on the typo of preferences. Three different types arc considered: standard von Neuinan Morgenstern expected utility, non-expected utility (Kreps-Porteus preferences), and habit formation preferences.
Preferences are often parameterized in the literature in a way that implies excessively high risk-free interest rates, wliich reduces the welfare gain measure. For example, the implicit risk-free rate in Cole and Obstfeld (1991) ranges from 5.0% to 50%. ®Most of this literature assumes endowment economies rather than production economies since it is concerned with the risksharing role of international capital markets and not the optimal resource allocation role.
The low welfare gain for a stationary process is consistent with the finding by Lucas [1987] that the cost of aggregate business cycle fluctuations is negligible. At long horizons business cycle uncertainty should be overshadowed by long term growth uncertainty.
risksharing, for a given horizon we regress, deviations from world growth on variables in the information set. This provides us with a measure of growth uncertainty at various horizons, which we use to compute the gain from international risl^haring.
This approach has three advantages. First, we don't need to specify an eritire model or data generating process. We use much less information since different processes (many quite compUcated) can be consistent with the same information set used to predict future growth. Choosing the wrong process, even if it is consistent with the correct information set, can lead to highly misleading results.
Second, even if one knows what type of process the endowment follows, it is not advisable to estimate it with annual data and then use this to determine growth uncertainty at loiig horizons. Imprecision in estimated parameters, e.g. due to small samples or multi-collinearity,' lead to imprecise predictions that are amplified significantly when making projections far enough into the future.
Finally; and most importantly, we find that the results "are robust to the size of the information set. After including the "three most important variables, expanding the information set with a large set of additional variables does not improve the explanatory ®For example, an AR(1) in A/n y {y=pvr capita ondowiiioiit). and the same process with a global cointogration term {In y -In y" ) added! lead tu the same information 'set to predict the deviation from world growth: the current and one period lagged Iwy -In y^^', where y"' is the world per capita endowment., But, as discussed above, these processes hayc. totally different welfare implications;. ®Whilc in the empirical growth hterature addiiional right hand side variables are significant, thisshould be no surprise since these are usually con (e.mporaneous variables. Instead, we use variables that are in the hiformation set at the time predictions about growth are made. For example, it should be no surprise that ex^post knowledge of significant political instability (revolutions and coups) reduces the ex-post prediction of growth. But, especially for a long horizon, knowledge about political instability in the past will have much less predictive power for future growth. ( 1) f=i^7 where Eq denotes the expectation at time zero. "
We assume an endowment economy, where yu is the per capita country i endowment at time t. The per capita world endowment is where nu is the popu lation in country i and Ut is the world population. Before risksharing cn = yit. Next we allow for trade in claims on the endowments.
As is shown in van Wincoop [1994] , for a specific country the welfare gain from risksharing depends both on the reduction in risk and the price of a claim on its endowment stream relative to that of a claim on the world endowment stream. Relative prices of endowment claims depend on the expected levels of endowments as well as the stochastic properties of the endowments. However,, if one for example has thirty years of data, using our approach it is hard to identify the endowment uncertainty of individual countries over a thirty year horizon. There is only one observation per country. We will therefore avoid the pricing problem by focusing on the welfare gain of a 'representative' country, called rep. For this country it is assumed that (i) the price of a claim on its per capita endowment stream relative to that of a claim on the per capita world endowment stream is one, and (ii) the variance of the innovation of endowment growth minus world endowment growth (defined below) is equal to the average over all countries. The first assumption imphes that Crep,t -yâ fter risksharing.
We impose two conditions which ensure that the relative price of a claim on the representative country's per capita endowment stream is one. First, at all horizons rep's expected per capita endowment is equal to the expected per capita world endowment:
•Co Vrep.! = Eo y^' {t.= 0,.., T"). This assumption has the additional advantage that there are no gains from intertemporal asset trade (consumption smoothing), so that we can a.ssuino that all goods arc tradablo. Optimal risksharing arraiigcmeiits in the presence of nontraded goods have been analyzed by Lewis [199Gb] , Tcsar[1993 Tcsar[ , 1995 and van Wincoop [1996b] . van Wincoop [1996b] shows that taking into account non-separability between traded and non-traded goods in utility generally raises the potential welfare gain from risksharing.^T his 'representative country' is an artificial construction, also used in vanWincoop [1996bj. It does not actuallv have to exist.
focus exclusively on the risksharing role of'international financial markets.
Second, the coyariance between-the growth innovation of'rep with the^world growth inno\'ation is the same as the variance of the world growth innovation. Using terminology usually used in reference to asset returns one might say that 'the beta of country rep's growth rate' is one. Appendix A shows-that these two conditions guarantee that the relative' price of the claim on rep's endowment-stream, is indeed -one.
-
The variables in the information set at time t used to predict future country i per capita endowment level are denoted by the.vector Zii of z country specific variables, and a vector Wt of w global variables. It is assumed that:
where the innovation ei^t,t+s over the period [t,t+s] has a normal distribution with ex pectation zero and variance The variance depends on the country and the horizon.
After taking logs, (2) impHes~. Here we used the assumption Eq yrep,t =^oV^-After risksharing
t=l In Appendix B it is shown, based on numerical simulations, that we can make the following very precise approximation:
A similar approximation is also made in van Wincoop [1994] and Lewis [1996a] . Per capita world output is a weighted average of log-normally distributed variables [yu), which is not log-normally distributed itself. (7) amounts to assumingan approximate lognormal distribution for per capita world output. Expected utility of the representative .
country after risksharing can then be approximated as
From (5) and (8) we can derive an expression of the welfare gain for the represen tative country. As is common in the welfare gains literature, the gain is computed as the permanent percentage increase in expected consumption that generates an equal Lewis [1996aj, in Appendix A, shows through Monte Carlo experiments that the log of world output is arbitrary close to a normal distribution if output of individual countries is log-normally distributed. After 4000 draws of a 22 year period for 7 countries, she cannot reject that the log of world output has no skewness and the kurtosis is 3, as it should be under a normal distribution. improvement in'welfare, as obtained from international riskshaxing. The welfare gain for the representative country is therefore:. > .
.
The weights f2f are defined as where yrep,t = ('^o is the certainty equivalent of rep's endowment at time
The weights Qi can be simplified by introducing'the following notation. Let" be the expected growth rate ofvthe world' per capita endowment over fO.tl:
The certainty equivalent" of rep's growth rate is = ' /^t -0.57C7^gpf. From the Eulerê quation, tHe t period real interest rate on a ri^kfree'bond is rt = pt -i-'jp-f With this
So the appropriate discount factor is the-difference between the'riskfree real interest rate and the risk adjusted growth rate.
While we use (9)'to' compute the welfare gain for the representative country,' a some what more intuitive expression, which numerically is very close to (9), can be obtained using the-approximations 1^-'x-and ( 1^1ax for x close to zero. This approximate welfare gain is '' ' .
• :
hich is equal to therate'of relative risk aversion divided by two, times a weigted average of the drop in the.variance of endowment growth:" whereby the weights depend oh the difference between the riskfree rate and the'riskadjusted'growth rate at various horizons.^,
In order to implement (9) to get an estimate of' the welfare gain' for a representative country, we need to (i) select a set of countries and'sample period, (ii)'choose a measure for the endowment ?/, (iii) choose a set ofvariables z in the information set, (iv) estimate the regression (4) for horizons s = (v) choose an estimate for the riskfree real interest rate and risk-adjusted growth rate at different horizons, and (vi) choose an estimate for the rate of relative risk aversion. In this section we will describe how this is done. The next section discusses the findings.
3.1
The Data
For now we limit our attention to post war data. Section 4.4 considers an extension to a 120 year sample of historical data. The main advantage of a post war sample is that far more data are available, so that we can select a much broader set of variables z in the information set. The disadvantage is that we have to limit ourselves to shorter horizons.
The two main data sets are the Penn World In order to select variables to be included in the information set, the,empirical growth literature provides a useful guideline. The problem however, as mentioned in Sala-i-. Martin [1994] , is that in this enormous literature over 50 variables have been found to be correlated with growth in at least one regression. This should not be a surprise, since there is significant multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables. Nonetheless this multi-collinearity problem is less of a concern to us than it is to those that attempt to identify which variables affect growth. After all, we are only interested in the residual variance, without being concerned which of the right hand side, variables really cause growth.
Assuming that a representative agent is no 'smarter' than the collective of individuals that have contributed to the empirical growth literature, we restrict our information set to the main variables that have emerged from this research. For now our measure of the endowment is per capita GDP, as in the growth literature, although other measures will be considered in section 4.3. Variables in the information set refer to the year in which predictions about future growth are made. In our 'base information set' we include thê ®Moreover, it is quite possible that one of the right hand side variables simply proxies for another, non-observed, variable that truely causes growth. log of initial per.capita GDP {log GDP); the. one year and 5 year lagged change in the log of per capita GDP {Ailog GDP.and A^log GDF);' the'five year lagged population growth rate (GPO); the ratio of private consumption to GDP (C/Y), the ratio of investment to GDP {I/Y)', the government consumption to GDP ratio (G/Y); openness as measured by exports plus imports, divided by GDI?, the gross, enroljment ratios for primary, secondary and higher education {PRIE, SECE, HIGHE)\ the fertility rate (FERT)^and hfe expectancy at birth (LIFE). In sensitivity analysis we consider a set of eighV' additional v^iables:' political instability measured as an average of revolutions and iassassinatibns over the past five years (PINSTAB), terms of trade growth over 'the p^t five "years (TOT), percentage of primary, secondary and higher school attained {PRIA; SECA^HIGHA), one year^nd five'year lagged private consumption^owth (Aj'c, A5C)'anci the investment ratio [I/Y) averaged over the p^t five years. The l^t five of the variables from the' 'base information set' and the first five from the additional variables are from tHe BL data set; the others are from the PWT. Since these variables have been eixtensively discussed in the growth literature we'refer to Barro [1991] , Barro and Lee'[1994] , iSarro and Sala-i-M^tin [1995 "and Xevirie'and Renelt'[1992 for justifications for including them in growth regressions.
We construct a sample'of'annual data from 1955 to 1990 for'a'set of 49 countries, 1960 ,1965 '. 1970 . 1975 , 1980 and 1985 almost a straight line between these observations for most countries we believe very little information is lost in doing so. Between 1955 Between and 1960 Between , and between i985 and 1990 extrapolate,^suming the same growth rate''as in the neighbouring 5 year interval.
For the two reniaiiiing BL variables, political instability arid terms oif trade growth, interpolation and extrapolation are unwarranted. In order to evaluate the importance of these variables, for the same^49 countries we consider a smaller sample from 1970 to-1990 in the sensitivity analysis, using only data'at five year intervals. ' We also consider a smaller'set of 21 OECD countries, listed'in Appendix C. The OECD countries.are ofparticular-interest since' their financial markets are well developed^S ince this includes five year lagged growth rates ui 1955, the sample really starts in 1950.
and most barriers to international capital flows have been eliminated. It is the lack of diversification among these countries that is one of the main puzzles in international macroeconomics.
Estimation of the Growth Regression
Estimation of Eqn. (4) is different fi'om standard growth regressions in several ways. First, only variables in the initial information set are used as right hand side variables. In contrast, it is common in the empirical growth literature to use contemporaneous variables. This leads to the well known causalityproblems, which our approach naturally avoids. Second, we subtract global averages from both the right and left hand side of Eqn. (3). In standard growth regressions (3) is estimated directly, with Kst (which includes the global variables) replaced with a constant term. The problem there is that the innovations €i^t,t+s positively correlated across coimtries, which is ignored in the regressions. Since the innovations are not independent, Mankiw [1995] concludes that statistical significance is overstated and reported standard errors associated with parameter estimates cannot be reUed upon. Since we subtract global averages, it is much more reasonable to assume that the innovations Ui^t,t+s uncorrelated across countries.
By construction this has to be correct on average. A final difference is that the growth literature usually only considers one cross section, while instead we use panel data to estimate Eqn. (4). We use all non-overlapping intervals of a given horizon, starting with the most recent observation in the sample. .For example, over the sample , the intervals for an 8 year horizon are 1982-1990; 1974-1982; 1966-1974; 1958-1966 . By using non-overlapping intervals the innovations should be uncorrelated across these observations. We can therefore estimate (4) for a particular horizon with OLS since the innovations are assumed to be uncorrelated both across time and across countries. A longer horizon imphes fewer observations per country and therefore less precision. For an horizon over 17 years there is only one observation, so that we are back at the standard cross section.
A final issue that needs to be discussed is the measurement of^1^4.0 = .
Since we don't know what the expectations are before estimating Eqn. (4), we follow the following multi-step procedure. First we estimate Eqn.(4) with equal country weights in order to obtain an estimate of This is used to obtain Oat+s = • (2-.j=i^ot+syjte^3^)
®This is the same as estimating (3) ..
= i=l where crj is the expected variance ofthe countryi residual conditional on the information set X. If for all countries this expected variance is independent of the information set,, and equal to the country average then (13) becomes so that cr^is an unbiased estimate of cr^. However, if the variance_is different across countries (13) shows that less weight is given to the variance of countries that are extreme in the sense that Zi is much larger or smaller than the world average (so that xf is large). To the extent that countries that are 'extreme' in the above sense ha.ve a larger expected variance , leadŝ ®Thc Gxact expression should be -r .3 . However, we don't have coun-" try specific estimates of the Moreover, exccpt at very long horizons differences in the (7?^'s across countries are unlikely to be large enough to have significant effect on the shares Oi.t.t+s--°The estimated residual is u = Au. where A = IjvTherefore B = to an underestimation of the average expected variance.
The welfare.gains reported below for a representative country should then be considered to be on the conservative side.
Throughout the paper the rate of relative risk-aversion is assumed to be three. This is the average of estimates in Friend and Blume [1975] . We consider it to be a good consensus estimate overall. However, it is easy to obtain the welfare gain for any other rate of relative risk-aversion. From (12) The risk-adjusted growth rate is /2t = /it -0.57cr^. We find that the annuahzed risk premium, 0.57a^/t, is somewhere between 0.001 (0.1%) and 0.005 (0.5%). A measure for fit can be found by taking a simple average growth rate of per capita GDP over the sample. The average annual growth rate from 1950 until 1990 is 2.1% for the 49 countries and 3.0% for OECD countries. The latter is high by historical standards though. For the historical data from 1870 until 1990, discussed in section 4.4, the average growth* rate over all 24 countries in that sample is 1.7%. We set the risk-adjusted growth rate at a constant 1.5% annually: /2f = 0.015t A measure of the riskfree rate Vt is constructed as follows. Over the period 1889 to 1978 Mehra and Prescott [1985] find an average annual real rate of 0.8% on relatively riskless three month US Treasury securities. In order to obtain an average term structure, we use data from 1947 until 1985 from McCulloch [1990] on the zero-coupon yield curve for Treasury bonds, j is set equal to 0.008, plus the average difference between the t year yield and the 3-month yield. Since only few observations are available at maturities over 30 years, we assume the yield curve is fiat after that. For sensitivity analysis, we will briefly consider'a 1% higher and lower annual riskfree rate {Art = ±0.0U).
-^For example, the poorest countries arc extrcino in that they have relatively low initial GDP. They might have relatively large uncertainty bocauso thcnvis a large potential upward mobility. When lagged growth is part of the information set it may be reasonable to argue that countries whose past growth has deviated significantly from the world average are on average the more 'risky' ones.
-In fact, the average yield curvc is almost flat after a ten year maturity. Tables 1 and 2 show'regression results for all 49 countries and the 21 OECD' countries respectively. Results are reported for the entire base information set as well as for a much smaller set of the three 'best' variables.
These are the ones that lead to the lowest welfkre gain at a 35 year horizon. As is well known, growth is h^d to predict at very short horizons. For a one year horizon the is 0.06 and 0.19 for the two sets of countries' respectively. But-it rises to 0.50 and 0.75 for the 35 year horizon. Parameter estimates associated with the entire base information set are imprecise, especially at the 35 year horizon. The only parameter that is si^ificant at all horizons is the log of initial per capita GDP. The imprecision is a result of a high degree of collinearity. Moreover, at the 35 year horizon there is one observation per'country, which iheans'that there are only'eight degrees of freedom left for the 21 OECD countries.
Parameter estimates are" quite precise at all horizons when the information set is limited to the three "best" variables, for wHich'the 35 year welfare gain is smallest. For the set of^9 countries these are the log of initial per capita GDP, the fertility rate and the investment rate. For the OECD countries the investment rate is replaced by enrollment in higher education os the third most important variable.
The fertility rate was also found to be significant in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995 . Brander'[1992] finds'that fertiUty declines'precede rather than lag higher growth rates. One reason it may be important as a predictor of future growth is that it has very direct and unambiguous implications for the fiitaire demographic structure of an economyBut there must be more to the fertility rate than demographics alone since it is even significant at the one' year horizon. The fertility rate turns out to be a good proxy for a wide variety variables. The average cross country correlation (over all 35 years of the sample) is 0:86 with population growth. At a theoretical level the important role of the'investment rate is not surprising. At an empirical level Levine and Renelt [1992] find the (contemporaneous) investment rate to be the single most important variable in growth regressions,*with its significance being robust to other variables added to the regression. They did not include fertihty in their 13^ study. It is not surprising that for the OECD countries em-ollment in higher education is an even more important predictor of future growth. Gro\\th in industrialized countries is obviously strongly associated with development of new technologies, which to a great extent is a product of investment in higher education. Tables 1 and 2 (ii) only the log of initial GDP is in the information set, (iii-iv) the information set consists of the two or three variables leading to the lowest welfare gain at a 35 year horizon.
Consistent with the findings by Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995] , for the larger group of countries initial GDP by itself does not have much predictive power (the convergence coefficient has the wrong sign and is often insignificant), while for OECD countries there is strong convergence. At a 35 year horizon the standard deviation of risidual risk for OECD countries drops significantly from 0.33 to 0.22 when only the log of initial per capita GDP enters the information set. Barro [1991] first found that even for a large set of 98 countries there is strong evidence of conditional convergence, in that initial GDP enters with a significantly negative sign once we control for some other variables. Consistent with that. Table 1 shows that even for the larger set of 49 countries initial GDP is strongly significant once we control for either two or twelve additional variables.
We can see from Figures 1 and 2 that almost all of the explanatory power comes from tliree variables. At an horizon up to 18 years the estimated standard deviation is practically identical when two. three or thirteen variables are included. Only for longer -^Since in that case we have no inforrnaLioii set to form expectations concerning the weights $, these weights are baiied on the expectation from the entire base information set. In all other cases the corresponding information set is used to form expectations abont the weights. If we take Figure 3 seriously, the countries with the largest positive deviation from expected growth are Japan and Canada. While the^owth rate of japan is 100% above the total OECD growth rate,'34% of that is unexpected. The Canadian growth rate is only 5% less than the OECD average, but'wks expected to' be almost 38% less. Some of the worst performers relative to expectation, with growth almost 20% below the predicted level, are Greece, New Zealand and the UK. For the'larger set of 49 countries, some of the best performers relative to expectation^e Japan, Thailand and Mexico.
Notice that this does not include'a lot of the 'Asian' miracles', such as Hong.Kong; Singapore. South Korea and Taiwan^These' countries are not in the sample due to incompleterdata. But it is clear that they' would have pushed the estimated variance up even further. Many of the worst performers compared to expectation are African and "^Since o*; = where ohs is tlu^imiulx'r of observations and z is the number of right hand side variables, it is clear that the estiniatc Ix'conics unstai)i(' when both the numerator and denomuiator approach zero as 2^obs.
• ' ' '' -®The low expected Canadian growth is to a {rr(?at extent the result of the highest fertility rate in the OECD. As discussed above, the fertility rateis closely associated with many important macroeconomic variables. Canada was expected to perform significantly below average based on a wide range ofsuch indicators. Compared to the OECD average, in 1955, it had a higher per capita GDP, lower growth in the past one and five years, a higher population growth rate, a higher consumption rate and lower enrollment in secondary and higher education. South American countries.
Welfare Gains
For the same information sets as in Figures 1 and 2, Figures 4 and 5 show the welfare gain for a representative country as a function of the horizon. Since the gain is based on a weighted average of the variance of residual risk at various horizons, the welfare gain curves are smoother than those for the standard deviations. At a 10, 20 and 35 year horizon welfare gains for these and other information sets axe also reported in Table 3 . Using the base information set, at a 35 year horizon the welfare gain is an enormous 6.61% for the 49 countries and a still very large 1.52% for OECD countries. In present discounted value terms this amounts to an increase in resources that is 221% of current output for the 49 countries, and 51% of current output for the OECD countries. These gains are also large when comparing this to the size of the US securities industry, which averaged to only 0.6% of GDP in the 1980s. So the potential costs of risksharing must be far below potential benefits.
For the 49 countries the gains are large even for very short horizons, 2.25% for a 10 year horizon. The gain of 0.45% for OECD countries at a 10 year horizon is relatively small though. At horizons longer than 35 years the welfare gain is of course even larger. It is hard to know how long the horizon of a, representative investor might be. In theory it could even be infinite if generations are always connected through operative intergenerational transfers. A conservative estimate for longer horizons can be obtained by assuming that the standard deviation of residual risk does not rise further beyond a 35 year horizon. For a 50 year horizon the welfare gain is then 9.55% and 2.27% for the two sets of countries. For a 100 year horizon these numbers are 13.26% and 3.15%."
It is hard to ignore the enormous size of these potential welfare benefits. It certainly does not rationalize the lack of risksharing observed in the data.
If we raise or lower the riskfree rate by 1% annually the results do not change dra matically. For example, for the set of 49 countries the welfare gain at the 35 year horizon drops from 6.61% to 6.24% when Ar, = 0.01/. and rises to 6.98% when An = -O.Olt. ®Seo vail Wincoop [1994] , pp. 187.
-'While our method doe's not rely on an assinncd underlying data generating process, it is worth noting that gains of this magnitude for OECD countries are somewhere in between those reported in van Wincoop [1996b] for a random walk process and an AR in growth rates. There the same rate of relative risk aversion was assumed, while the risk-adjusted growth rate and riskfree interest rate are of similar magnitude as in this paper.
From Figures 4 and 5 we see that for most horizons the welfare gain based on the three best variables is very similar to that based on all 13 variables. This is an important finding, which is obviously closely related to.that for the standard deviations in Figures  1 and 2 , It shows that once .the three most important variables are included in the information.set, the welfare gain results are robust to adding'additional variables. This stands in sharp contrast to computing welfare' gains based on endowment processes, where results are very sensitive to changes in the type of process-and small' parameter changes of a given process.
' " • ' Table 3 reports results-from adding some additional vmables •beyond the base "in formation set. In row 7 we add the average investment rate over-the past-five years, which is less sensitive to the up and downs of a particular year. It has practically no effect on the results. In row 8 we add the percentage of primary, secondary and higher school-attained..These can be considered stock variables, as opposed to the enrollment variables, which represent flows.. Again, adding these variables does not significantly affect on the results. Finally,-we add the lagged consumption growth rates over the past one and five years. Since consumption should be based on forward looking behaviour; these might be important. But again there are no notable effects on the welfare gain measure. . .
Based on the shorter, period 1970-:1990 , without interpolated data, we also consider adding political instability (number of revolutions and assasinations) and terms of trade growth, both over the. past five years. These variables also have very little effect on the estimated welfare gain. For the 49 countries, the three 'best variables' (leading to the lowest -welfare" gain over a twenty, year horizon) are now initial GDP, the fertility rate .and the terms of trade growth. The latter replaces the investment rate.. For that information set the welfare gain is 3.72% over a 20 year horizon. However, the welfare gain is an almost identical 3.75% when-the information set consists of the 'old top three'
(initial,GDP, fertility rate and investment rate).: When terms of trade growth is added to 'the old top three', the welfare gain drops negligibly to' 3.62%.''Terms of trade growth has significant predictive power for short horizons, but is'insignificant for' the twenty year horizon. Since long term, growth uncertainty'is the primary source: of welfare-, gains, it is likely that the terms of trade plays even less of"a role at horizons longer than^E aatcrly, et al. [1993] , Fisher [1993] and Mcndoza [1994] all find that'terms of trade growth has significant predictive power, but they don't inchule the investment rate in their growth regressions. This is consistent with our finding's. Fisher |1993] and Mendoza [1994] also find that the terms oftrade is a much better predictor at short than long horizons. 20 years. Evans and Karras [1996] suggest that the parameters ofa given output process may be different across countries and that this could significantly affect convergence estimates.
We have assumed that the vector A^, which measures the impact of the variables in the information set on growth expectations, is equal across countries. For long horizons we axe unable to estimate Xg separately for each country since we have only one observation per country. However, differences across countries are related to more fundamental economic differences that should be captured in the information set itself. In order to allow for differences across countries in the relationship between specific variables and growth expectations, we experiment with adding to the regressions various interaction terms involving the three best variables. Our welfare measure is not significantly affected however.
We also experiment with different functional forms, adding the log of initial endow ment squared, or using the log of fertility and investment rates instead of the levels.
These experiments also don't have a substantial effect on the welfare gain results.
So far we have ignored potential measurement,error inour data. DeLong [1988] shows that the convergence parameter can be significantly affected when there is measurement error in initial income. Measurement error is likely to be more severe for data in 1955 than in 1990. We ask ourselves what happens to the estimate of 0-35 when we add additional measurement error to the log of 1955 per capita output of each country. This leads to additional random variaton of 1955 per capita output around the true level. Assuming that, this error has a standard deviation of 0.05, a 95 % confidence interval of the additional random variation is 20% of measured per capita GDP (2 standard deviations up and. down), which is quite significant. We compute 0-35 500 times, each time using different randomly perturbed 1955 output data. When the information set consists of the best three variables, the average (T35 we obtain is 34.77% for the 49 countries. This is only shghtly larger than the standard deviation of 34.59% of residual risk based on measured 1955 GDP data. A similar result applies to OECD countries.
So long term growth uncertainty, which matters most for the welfare gain measure, is not affected significantly by introducing a reasonable degree of measurement error.
we add to the three best variables all possible interaction terms, the welfare gaiix for the 49 countries, baaed on a 35 year horizon, drops only sliglitly from 7.35% to 7.27%.
4.3,. Alternative Endowment Measures
; Table 4 reports welfare gains for two alternative endowment measures, corresponding to two potential problenis associated with per capita GDP. The first is best illustrated by writing per capita GDP^pf *e, where pr is productivity per worker and e is per capita effort. Effort is defined as total ho^iirs worked. To some extent individual effort is not really a control variable'for that individual. Examples are involuntary unemployment, or national customs with respect to female participation in the labor force, the work week and vacation time. If'effort were compietdy determined by national factors, not under the control of individual agents;' and we also ignore the utility cost of effort, the correct endowment measure for this paper is per capita GDP. At "the other extreme, one may consider effort to be entirely an individual specific choice variable. In that case it is optimal to engage in risksharing with respect to national productivity pr. which is then the correct endowment measure. In Table 5 we consider GDP per worker as an alternative endowment ine^ure. While it wo'iid 'be even better to have .data on GDP per hour worked, data on hours per week are often not available.
A second problem with per capita GDP as an endowment measure is that it includes both investment and consumption goods. As an alternative we therefore consider per capita private consumption. The issue of investment brings up two questions, one as sociated with the distinction between production and endowment economies, another with moral hazard. Most of the literature on welfare gains from international riskshar ing considers endowment economies, as does this paper. This ignores potential gains that are specific to actual production economies. It is possible that there are additional gains from trade in risky productive technologies if it leads to a gradual shift over time towards capital in relatively low risks, or high expected return, countries. We-focus exclusively on the risksharing role of^set trade', even though this is hard to separate from the resource allocation role in actual production economies.^I ndividual effort should be broadly interpreted. We implicitly assume that all individuals have access to the same production function' with productivity jrr. if one individual is less productive than another, it is attributed to less 'effort'. 'Obstfeld [1994a) considers a world with trade in risky capital, whereby he-makes.the-extreme' assumption that these productive assets are in infinite supply. This leads to enormous welfare gains, ranging' from 22.6% for East Asia to 478.4% for non-East Asia, since agents can-shift their resources to the highest expected return, lowest risk assets. While the assumption that these assets are in infinite supply is rather extreme, it does illustrate a potentially significant additional benefit associated with optimal resource allocation. ' ' ' " '
The potential moral hazard problem associated with investment is easily illustrated with the Japanese example. If the OECD countries had engaged in perfect risksharing during our sample, Japan would have had to make significant transfers to the rest of the world because of its unexpected high growth. One might, argue that this is unreasonable because they have themselves borne the costs of this growth through high investment in machinary, equipment, infrastructure, and human capital. This appears, to be a moral hazard problem since it would not be optimal for Japan to have made this investment if it were engaged in perfect risksharing. It is important to realize however that for one individual there is no moral hazard problem associated with investment in either physical or human capital since the individual does not control the behaviour of, others. Moral hazard does arise at the government level to the extent that government policy affects long term growth. However, Shiller [1993] argues that governmental moral hazard is present even in existing financial markets and has not prevented them from functioning.
Governments have a strong incentive to cooperate after risksharing in order to stimulate growth at a global level, and can impose heavy penalties on a government that cheats. Table 4 reports the results for all three endowment measures. For the set of 49 countries the welfare gain based on the 35 year horizon drops a bit from 6.61% to 5.81% when output per worker is used as the endowment. But it rises to 7.26% when the endowment is per capita consumption. This is based on all 13 variables, but a similar result applies to the three best variables (1, 6, and 12) and also to shorter horizons. For OECD countries, using GDP per worker as the endowment instead of per capita GDP has practically no effect on the welfare gain measure for the 10 and 20 year horizons. However, using all 13 variables the welfare gain drops from 1.52% to 1.02% for the 35 year horizon. This result is unreliable though due to the few remaining degrees of freedom. For the three best variables (1, 11, 12) the welfare gain drops only slightly from 1.47% to 1.35%. For this same information set, replacing GDP with private consumption as the endowment measure leads to a slightly higher welfare gains at the 10 year horizon, but somewhat lower at the 35 year horizon. Overall we can conclude that the benchmark endowment measure (per capita GDP) does not provide a significantly biased (either upward or downward) estimate of welfare gains in comparison with thê^S hiller also notes that govemniciits can be monitored better than individuals and that explicit contract provisions can rule out settlement based on obvious negative policies. Government policy can of course significantly affect both aggregate and private consumption. For moral hazard reasons trade in claims on GDP might therefore be more easily achievable than trade in a consumption based asset.
alternative, endowment measures. The fact that welfare gains are'riot systematically lower when using consumption data also indicates that the degree of risksharing already achieved is very limited.
4.4
Historical Data
We now apply the methodology to historical data from 1870 to ,1990. ' This allows us to compute welfare gains over longer horizons, but h£^the disadvantage that the information set is limited to a much smaller set of variables for which historical data are available. We include both initial GDP and the fertihty rate in the li^ormation set.
The results for post war data indicate that most of the explanatory power comes from these two variables. We also experiment with including lagged growth rates of GDP and
GDP and population data are, from Maddispn [1995] . Fertility rates come from various sources, listed in Appendix D, and are available for 24 countries. GDP data, are not available for every year. We only use years for which data are available fon alL countries in the sample. For all 24 countries GDP data are available in 1870, 1900, 1913, 1929, 1938, and 1947-:1990 . For smaller sets of countries it is available for more years. Table 5 reports the countries and their per capita GDP (in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars) at different points in time.
One has to be careful in choosing the set of countries to be included in the sample. DeLong [1988] criticized Baumol's [1986] . cross sectional growth regressions as being biased towards convergence since the sample includes only countries that haVe ex-post converged. Instead, DeLong 1988 chooses a set of 22 countries based ;on a relatively high initial (rather than ex-post) income.
We will consider various sets of countries, dependent on the cutoff for 1870 GDP. This ranges from the richest eight in 1870 to thê^T he fertility.rate is defined fLs tlu; crude l)irtli rato. Tlic fertility rate, from the Barro Lee dataset that we used for the post-war data is dofiiied as the cxpccted number of babies during .the hfetime of a woman, which is based on currcnt information on tlic nunil)cr of babies women have at various ages.
However, we find that for the post-war period tlic avora«(e time series correlation between these two series (over 49 countries) is 0.997;'and the 19G0 (tos.s section'correlation is 0.9898. -We therefore find" that our welfare gain results for the post-war period remain substantially unaltered' when we use the crude birth rate as the definition of tlie fertility rate.
in Geary-Khamis dollars refers to a purcriiasing power parity based GDP measure, using international average prices of commodities, just as in the Penn World Tables. There is a nice discussion of the Geary-Khamis approach in Maddispn. [1995] ,.pp. [162] [163] [164] [165] .^A ll countries with 1870 GDP above 300 1975 dollars are included.
entire set of all 24 countries. Baumol, Blackman and Wolff [1989] show that the cutoff point is important for convergence. They consider the top'8 through the top 14 based on 1870 GDP and find stronger convergence among the richest countries. Figure 6 shows the welfare gain for a 120 year horizon as a function of the number of countries in the sample, including successively poorer countries based on 1870 GDP.
For the richest eight the welfare gain is 4.88%. Only after inluding the 17th country, Argentina, does the gain rise significantly to 7.75%. Argentina's performance has been far below average during the sample. The other break occurs after including the last country, India. The welfare gain then rises from 9.3% to 16.5%. As shown in Table 5 , India's per capita GDP only slightly more than doubled from 1870 to 1990, while for the average country it increased by a factor of 9.
These gains are very substantial, even for the smallest set of rich countries. For the richest 8 countries in 1870, growth performance has varied widely. As shown in Table 5 , Australia was 75% richer than Switzerland in 1870, but was 32% poorer than Switzerland in 1990. Similarly, New Zealand was 27% richer than the US in 1870, but was 56% poorer than the US in 1990. Within Europe, the UK was 71% richer than Germany in 1870, but was 15% poorer than Germany in 1990. While these different growth rates were to a limited extent predictable in 1870, the potential welfare gain of 4.88% shows that there is substantial residual risk. We beheve that this is indicative of the current OECD countries. Up to the 35 year horizon the estimated standard deviation of residual risk is about the same as that reported for the 21 OECD countries in section 4.2. After that it rises somewhat more, from 0.15 at the 35 year horizon to 0.20 at the 120 year horizon. The welfare gain of 17% for the set of 24 countries is indicative of the gain from risksharing among a broad set of countries. For the 35 year horizon the estimated standard deviation of residual risk is 0.30, similar to that for the set of 49 countries based on post war data. It then rises to 0.40 at the 120 year horizon.
Adding lagged growth rates of per capita GDP and population to the information set has little effect on the results. For a set of 22 countries the welfare gain for a 90 year horizon is 13.54% when the information set consists of the fertility rate and initial per capita GDP, and drops only marginally to 12.96% when 20 year lagged endowment and population growth are added. We find that the welfare gain estimate even rises a bit when 10 or 30 year lagged growth rates are included in the information set.
Since prewar output measurement error is potentially severe, we perform a similar take out Switzerland and Hungary, for which data in 1890 are not available measurement error experiment as at the end of section 4.2. This time we consider what happens when we introduce an additional random disturbance to the log of 1870 per capita GDP with a standard error of 15%. This means that the 95 % confidence interval of the additional random variation is an enormous 60% of measured 1870 per capita GDP. Nonetheless we find that our average <7120 for the 24 countries, based on 500 different draws of perturbed 1870 per capita GDP in each country, is 41.50%, which is only a little bit higher than the estimate of 40.15% based on measiu-ed data. So it is unlikely that our welfare gain measure is significantly affected by pre-war measurement error in GDP.
Conclusions
We have developed a new methodologj' for measuring potential welfare gains from inter national risksharing. one that is closely connected with the empirical growth Bterature. In contrast to the latter, we have focused on growth uncertainty rather than factors that might explain growth ex-post. Thus, our regressions are not subject to the stan dard causality problems of the empirical growth literature. Our results axe robust to the size of the information set in that adding additional variables beyond the two or three most important ones (initial GDP, fertility rate and investment) does not change the welfare measure substantially. In contrast, previous work on international risksharing has relied on specific assumptions about the endowment process and found the results to be extremely sensitive to the particular process assumed. Here we have taken a much more direct route in measuring what ultimately matters for risksharing, the variance of residual risk at various horizons.
Lsing a variety of sources for both post-war and historical data, we conclude that potential welfare gains from global risksharing are very large. For a 35 year horizon, using post war data, the gain corresponds to an equivalent permanent increase in consumptiori of 6.6% when based on a set of 49 countries, and 1.5% when based on 21 OECD countries.
Using historical data from 1870 to 1990. we find that the potential gain for a 120 year horizon ranges from 4.9% for a small set of rich countries to 16.5% for a broad set of 24
countries.
There are three important directions for future research. One question that we have not addressed in this paper is how large potential gains from risksharing are among regions within a country. Since macro markets do not currently exist even within nations.
there might be a significant potential to share risk for example among the US states. A second and closely related question that needs to be addressed is whether one really needs macro markets (claims on GDP) in order to achieve risksharing. If for example the retm-n of claims on corporate dividends (stock) is highly correlated with the return of 'claims on GDP over long periods of time, most of the potential welfare gains can be achieved through the existing stock markets. Finally, even though the focus of this paper is on.risksharing, the methodology can also be applied to compute potential gains from consumption smoothing through intertemporal asset trade (a riskfree bond). To that end all we need to know is the expected deviation from world consumption growth at different horizons. This is a byproduct of our analysis.^v
an Wincoop [1995] shows that for Japanese prefectures cross region consumption correlations are just as low as cross country consumption correlations and explains this in a model where asset trade among regions,is limited to riskfree bonds and equity (no macro markets). The price of a claim on the per capita world endowment is Eili Using the first order conditions, and the fact that in equilibrium =5?^-= the relative price of a claim on rep's per capita endowment is:
XliPinit/m .Eoiy^r^: -yrep,t has a log-normal distribution,' and so does the per capita endowment for every other country While the distribution of is not exactly log-normal; Appendix 3 shows that it is very close to a log-normal distribution of-the'form yf = (Eq Using this approximation aijd yrep,t = Substituting these exv pressions for y^and yrep,t into to form\ila for the relative -price, dt follows immediately from the assumptions (i) and (ii) that the relative price is one.. Appendix B Numerical approximation in eqn, (7) In order to show that the numerical approximation in (7) is very |Close we draw e = (^1.0,*!0,0'from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance S.' We don't have any direct measure of e, as the analysis focuses on the uncertainty about the devia tion from world growth, captured by the u's. We know that var{€rep,o,t) = var{urep,o,t) + In order to allow for large imcertainty about global shocks, for this exercise we.assume var{€^,) = var{urep,o,t), so th3,i var{erep,Q,t) = 2i;ar(^^,p.o.().; We moreover assume that T;ar(ei,o,() is the same for all countries, which appears on the diagonal of Endowment=GDP' per capita 
